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SYSTEMS APPROACH TO THE CONCEPT OF ENVIRONMENT1' 2
BERNARD C. PATTEN, Department of Zoology and Institute of Ecology, University of Georgia,
Athens, GA 30602
Abstract. A systems theory of environment formulates causal interactions between
things, including organisms, and their environments in terms of four system theoretical
abstract objects. Creaons receive stimuli and implicitly create input environments.
Genons react to received causes and generate potential output environments as effects.
A holon represents the combined input-output model of an entity consisting of a creaon
and a genon. An environ is a creaon and its corresponding input environment, or a
genon and its related output environment. The theory is presented in terms of three
propositions that: (1) recognize two distinct environments (input and output) asso-
ciated with things, (2) establish things and their environments as units (environs) to
be taken together, and (3) partition systems into input and output environs
associated with intrasystem creaons and genons, respectively.
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Ecology is the biological science of en-
vironment. It considers environment as
a derivative of physiology in the sense
that environment contains resources to
be mobilized by organisms, and condi-
tions of life under which this mobilization
must occur. The resource in least sup-
ply at any given time is rate limiting (law
of the minimum), as is the factor, such as
temperature, in greatest extreme (law of
tolerance). Thus, the organism is seen
by ecology to inhabit a physiological life
space bounded by conservative and non-
conservative elements of its environment
—resources and factors, respectively.
The nature and composition of this life
space varies according to the character
of the larger system of which the organ-
ism is seen as a part. Population aspects
of environment encompass the intra-
specific reproductive, genetic, demo-
graphic and social worlds of the organ-
ism. A community aspect refers to in-
terspecific biotic associations. The eco-
system aspect takes into account all fea-
tures of the organism's biotic and abiotic
interactions.
Although the strict ecological idea of
environment is based on the individual
1Manuscript received January 19, 1977 and
in revised form June 15, 1978 (#77-6).
2University of Georgia Contributions in Sys-
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organism, loose usage frequently extends
the concept from individuals to groups
{our environment), or suggests something
absolute (the environment). The dic-
tionary defines environment variously as:
"the surrounding conditions, influences or
forces that influence or modify; the whole
complex of climatic, edaphic and biotic
factors that act upon an organism or an
ecological community and ultimately de-
termine its form and survival; the aggre-
gate of social and cultural conditions that
influence the life of an individual or com-
munity," (Merriam-Webster 1971). The
significant features of environment in
ordinary usage are that some defined sub-ject (individual or group) is immersed in
or surrounded by it, and influenced by
it through a causal relationship. This
causality, as developed below, is the
basis for the present attempt to express
environment in terms of system theory,
which is the purpose of this paper.
SYSTEMS DEFINITIONS
Systems ecology is a branch of ecology
that applies systems thinking and meth-
ods to ecological problems. Several def-
initions of basic system concepts are use-
ful in prospect of a systems approach to
defining environment. A system is a
partially interconnected (interacting or
causally joined) set of components. In-
teractions may be mediated by energy-
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matter through transactions, or by infor-
mation through communications. Trans-
actions and communications correspond,
respectively, to transfers of conservative
resources and nonconservative factors in
the physiological account of environment
described above.
In a hierarchical model of nature, any
given system can usefully be abstracted
as three discrete levels separated out of a
hierarchical continuum: system, subsys-
tem and supersystem. Subsystems are
components of the systems. Supersys-
tems are composed of systems. Koestler's
(1967) term "holon" for a hierarchical
system can be used to refer to any of
these three levels of organization, accord-
ing to the frame of reference.
A system is closed if it does not interact
with another system, and open if it re-
ceives causes from or generates effects to
another system. A system boundary
provides the interface with other systems
and is defined by specifying its component
set. Input is any movement of energy-
matter or information from supersystem
to system, and output is any similar
movement across the system boundary in
the opposite direction.
ECOLOGICAL CONCEPTS OF
ENVIRONMENT
Environment as a concept has not been
treated very seriously in ecological litera-
ture and only a few explicit works are
available. Mason and Langenheim (1957)
defined environmental phenomena as those
that have or may have an operational re-
lation with any organism. The environ-
mental relation of an organism is the sum
of empirical relations between the en-
vironmental phenomena and any indi-
vidual organism. The operational en-
vironment of an organism consists of those
instantaneous environmental phenomena
that actually enter a relation with an or-
ganism; the concept applies to specific in-
dividual organisms. Space and time
frames of the operational environment
are determined by the organism. The
life span of the organism corresponds to
the existence time of its operational en-
vironment. Potential environment con-
sists of the set of environmental phenom-
ena that may enter into an environmental
relation at some point in the ontogeny of
an organism. Non-environment consists
of all phenomena (indirect, historical and
organism-caused) which never enter into
a direct environmental relation with the
organism.
Mason and Langenheim (1957) as-
serted, "the environment of any organ-
ism is the class . . . of those phenomena
that enter a reaction system of the organ-
ism or otherwise directly impinge upon it
to affect its mode of life at any time
throughout its life cycle as ordered by the
demands of the ontogeny of the organism
or as ordered by any other condition . . .
that alters its environmental demands."
Only direct factors were considered part
of environment. "[Indirect and histori-
cal] factors both function to condition a
phenomenon . . . to which an organism
then reacts. Important as this is to the
ecosystem the only [organism] reaction
. . . is to an already conditioned phe-
nomenon. The state of the phenomenon
prior to its conditioning is outside the
scope of operational . . . and . . . po-
tential environment. . . . This may seem
to rest upon trivial distinctions, but we
are convinced that this is the precise
boundary between clarity and confusion
in the problems of the environment."
Thus, chains and networks of historical
causation, which condition direct factors,
are excluded from Mason and Langen-
heim's (1957) concept of environment:
" . . . we must reject the implication that
. . . [causal] chains constitute a unitary
event playing a significant role in the en-
vironmental relation even though the
steps are very important to the ecosys-
tem. . . . There is also a philosophical
reason for removing indirect factors from
the concept of environment. To intro-
duce indirect factors into causal relations
within the environment is to introduce an
infinite regress into the system of expla-
nation. Every cause has in turn itself
a cause which becomes an indirect cause
of the most recent effect. The regress is
toward the limbo of ultimate cause along
an infinitely reticulating path; for this
we have neither finite description nor
finite explanation. . . . To include such
relations in environment is to confuse en-
vironment with its history."
A systems ecology concept of environ-
ment must take issue with the Mason and
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Langenehim theory. The whole thrust
of a systems understanding of nature is
to reconstruct the main patterns of causa-
tion in models. Within the confines of a
finite model forming a whole from inter-
connected parts, an expanded concept of
environment of the parts is possible,
which includes both direct and indirect
factors. The intrasystem causal net-
work is never an unknown infinite regress,
but is explicit to the model boundary
which constitutes the limit of finite de-
scription and explanation which were
lacking in Mason and Langenheim's time.
While the conditioning of direct causes by
indirect effects may be temporally ante-
cedent, ecosystems and their models are
persistent or recurrent organizations so
that historical patterns of causation are
relevant, with perhaps small corrections
for evolution, to present and future pat-
terns as well.
Such a systems view of environment
has precedent in an ecological work by
Haskell (1940), who focused on events in
the universe that may eventually in-
fluence an organism during its lifetime.
Their influence is limited by how fast
causality can be propagated, no faster
ultimately than the speed of light. Thus,
corresponding to each instant in the life
of an organism is a light cone. (Haskell
1940, fig. 1) bounding the spatiotemporal
extent of possible causes. The cones di-
minish in time as the universe that can
possibly affect the ageing organism
contracts: "The cones prepresent . . .
a steadily shrinking region . . . within
which the fastest moving process—light,
traveling at about 300,000 km a second—
can start, at any point-instant . . . dur-
ing the organism's existence, and effect
(sic) it before its end. . . . This region is
equal to a geometric hyperbody, denned
below as 'habitat', and, constitutes part
of 'environment.' Habitat is the "im-
mediate environment" (Haskell 1940, p.
7), taken as Weaver and Clements (1929)
denned it: "Every part of the environ-
ment that exerts directly or otherwise
[i.e., indirectly] a specific influence upon
the life of the plant is a factor of the
habitat."
Thus, Haskell's concept of environment
includes not only the direct causes of
Mason and Langenheim, but indirect
causes as well, so long as their eventual
influences can be propagated to a sub-
ject, such as an organism, during its
existence interval. Systems ecology mod-
els that represent complex intrasystem
webs of direct and indirect causation
make it possible to implement such an
expanded concept of environment. A
formal approach to such implementation
is described below.
HOLONS
General systems theory defines a sys-
tem to be a partially interconnected set of
objects, then proceeds to describe the ob-jects and various aspects of their inter-
active coupling. Formal details differ
with the specific theory, but most general
systems objects have in common that in
some sense they perform a double map-
ping of time into state, then state into
output. Examples are "finite state ma-
chines" of Gill (1962), "abstract objects"
of Zadeh and Desoer (1963), Wymore's
(1967) "formal systems," the "general
systems" of Klir (1969) given according
to five definitions, "T-processors" of
Windeknecht (1971), and "general time
systems" of Mesarovic and Takahara
(1975). All such units may be made
causal, and can be generalized under the
nonspecific hierarchical object, holon
(Koestler 1967). An extensive theory of
the causal holon as the basis for a systems
concept of environment has been pre-
sented elsewhere (Patten et al 1976),
based on Zadeh's model (Zadeh and
Desoer 1963, Zadeh 1969). This theory
is outlined below, with notation modified
according to Mesarovic and Takahara
(1975).
To model a causal link between two
entities requires some kind of process or
object whose action converts cause to
effect. Such an object, H, is a relation
on attributes, VeA, that are time func-
tions in a time domain, T. For each aeA
a is a behavior V e^T, a(t) is the value of a
at time teT, a,* is the segment of a prior
to /, and at is the behavior segment of a
beginning at and following /. This ob-ject definition provides latitude in select-
ing the set A of behavioral attributes.
The holon becomes oriented when its
set of attributes is partitioned into inputs,
Z, and outputs, Y. The relation H on
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A is then expressed as a set of input-
output time segments: (z,y)eH, zeZ and
yeY. The oriented holon associates re-
sponse (output) time sequences with
stimulus (input) histories. In develop-
ing the holon as a causal object, given
output sequences must be uniquely as-
sociated with given input segments. This
property is incorporated in the notion of
a functional holon, where H is construed
as a map (function) of inputs, z, into out-
puts, y. Such an object is said to be
determinate, i.e., a time series of inputs
from its environment uniquely deter-
mines a corresponding time series of
outputs.
Dynamic behavior of a determinate ob-ject occurs in response to the object's en-
vironment's behavior, which is received
as input. This is modeled by introduc-
ing a third set, X, of object variables,
states. Heuristically, inputs zeZ serve to
map time teT into states xeX, and the
states take inputs zeZ into outputs yeY.
States are generated by a state transition
function:
0:ZXX->X,
and outputs are generated by a response
function:
The only other requirement for a de-
terminate holon to be causal is that it not
respond at time / to inputs received after
t. That is, the object cannot anticipate
its future environment; it is nonanticipa-
tory. If a determinate object were to
generate more than one output sequence
corresponding to a given input sequence,
the only way it could do this (since it is
determinate) would be based on informa-
tion about the future. This possibility
is precluded for the causal object.
The full theory (Patten et at 1976)
should be consulted for details. The
causal holon may serve at either the
system or subsystem level. The focus
of the original work was on intrasystem
propagation of causes between subsystem
level holons. As a result, consequences
of the theory for a system concept of
environment were not as clearly per-
ceived as they are now. Environment is
normally a supersystem level concept.
Causation was considered to be intro-
duced as inputs from an environment at
the supersystem/system interface, then
propagated through the interactive net-
work connecting subsystem holons, and
finally dissipated as output effects gene-
rated to the environment across the sys-
tem boundary. The key to recognizing
the main features of the theory and its
implications for an improved concept of
environment lay in focusing on intra-
system environments associated with sub-
system level holons. These environ-
ments may be explicitly identified and
measured as a causal reticulum within a
system model, with consequences that
emerge as three main points of the theory.
These points are developed as specific
propositions in the next three sections.
FIRST PROPOSITION
Proposition 1: Every object H defines
two environments: an input environment
H', and an output enviroment H". The
prerogative of environment definition is
that of the object.
The causal model of subject/environ-
ment interaction leads to not one, but
two equally plausible and useful concepts
of environment. The first is input en-
vironment H\ defined by holon H in the
act of receiving energy-matter or perceiv-
ing information. Behavioral attributes
of the real world that do not impact H as
input during its existence interval cannot
influence the state of the object. They
go unrecorded by H and consequently
are not part of its environment. So
basic is this environment defining func-
tion that this aspect of the holon is given
(Patten et al 1976) a special name, creaon,
to signify an implicit act of environment
creation. Mason and Langenheim (1957)
restrict the concept of (input) environ-
ment to phenomena that "directly im-
pinge" upon the organism, whereas Has-
kell (1940) includes, in addition, the indi-
rect causes from which direct ones are gen-
erated. The latter, and the present ap-
proach, are more consistent with a sys-
tems view, and in the context of finite
ecosystem models do not produce the in-
finite causal regress to which Mason and
Langenheim objected. That is, when H
is a subsystem level component, W is
traceable only to the model boundary, be-
coming beyond this merely undiffer-
entiated input to the system level. The
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within system portion of H} is thus ex-
plicit in the concept of input environment.
Reciprocally, the second concept of en-
vironment is that of an output environ-
ment Hn. This begins as a set of potential
environments embodied in the states of
H. These states are converted to out-
puts through interaction of H with other
objects (creaons). This is, to produce an
actual output environment from potential
environment implicit in the state struc-
ture of H requires holon production of
potential attributes, then sequential cre-
aon selections to achieve realization of
these potentials. Output environment
Hn is the resultant causality propagated
from H as a network of direct and indirect
effects. This environment generating
property of holons is equally basic to the
creaon function, and to distinguish it the
name genon is given (Patten et al 1976).
As in the creaon case, an infinite progres-
sion of effects from // is implied, but at
the component level in the context of
finite models, the progression terminates
at the system level boundary beyond
which only undifferentiated output is
recognized. The within system portion
of Hn is thus explicit in the concept of
output environment.
Neither Haskell (1940) nor Mason and
Langenheim (1957) considered output
environment as a proper component of
the general concept of environment.
However, an older physiological theory
provides explicit justification for the out-
put environment, von Eexkiill (1926)
presented a picture of environment as an
organism surrounder in terms of the fol-
lowing set of concepts:
World-as-sensed: "Every animal is a
subject, which, in virtue of the structure
peculiar to it, selects stimuli from the
general influences of the outer world, and
to these it responds in a certain way."
World-of-action: "These responses, in
their turn, consist of certain effects on
the outer world, and these again influence
the stimuli."
Function-circle: "In this way there
arises a self-contained periodic cycle,
which we may call the function-circle of
the animal. The function circles . . .
connect up . . . in the most various
ways, and together form the function-
world of living organisms, within which
plants are included. For each individual
animal, however, its function-circles con-
stitute a world by themselves, within
which it leads its existence in complete
isolation."
Inner world: "The sum of the stimuli
affecting an animal forms a world in itself.
The stimuli, considered in connection
with the function circle as a whole, form
certain indications which enable the ani-
mal to guide its movements. . . . The
animal itself, by the very fact of exercis-
ing such direction, creates a world for it-
self, which I shall call the inner world."
Surrounding world: "World-of-action
and world-as-sensed together make a
comprehensive whole, which I call the
surrounding world."
World-as-sensed and world-of-action
correspond to input and output environ-
ments, respectively, and the latter is thus
clearly distinguished. Moreover, von
Uexkull's view of the organism/environ-
ment relation is unitary: "The entire
function circle formed from inner world
and surrounding world . . . constitutes a
whole which is built in conformity with
plan, for each part belongs to the others,
and nothing is left over to chance . . .
where there is a foot, there is also a path;
where there is a mouth, there is also food;
where there is a weapon, there is also an
enemy. . . . If this circle is interrupted
at any point whatsoever, the existence of
the animal is imperilled. . . . continuity
of the complete whole must never be lost
sight of." Output and input environ-
ments are continuous through the func-
tion circles of the organism, and that con-
tinuity erases, in theory, any distinction
between them. However, there is the
matter of practicality to be considered:
"All the [function] circles, however far
they lie separated from one another in the
world-as-sensed, intersect in the steering
apparatus of the inner world, and then
separate from one another again in the
world-of-action." World-as-sensed (in-
put environment) and world-of-action
(output environment) are, for all practical
purposes, separate by virtue of the enor-
mity of reality compared to the identifi-
able sphere of influence of any single
organism (holon).
Thus, the first proposition. Every in-
teracting thing in nature defines two
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separate and distinct environments, both
taken to include the network of causes
and effects as far as these are traceable in
any particular model in which the defin-
ing object serves as a component.
SECOND PROPOSITION
Proposition 2: The internal cause prop-
agating structure of systems cannot be com-
pletely determined, i.e., all causal paths in
the interactive network accounted for, with-
out input or output reference to an external
environment. The prerogative of realiza-
tion of internal system structure is that of
environment.
This proposition, developed in detail in
Patten et al (1976), can best be presented
here in terms of an example. Figure 1
illustrates a simple steady state model of
marine coprophagy (Cale and Ramsay
1970, description in Patten et al 1976,
Appendix). The model consists of four
holons in series, with a feedback loop
connecting H3 and H4. Hi is a mud crab,
Callianassa major; H2 is the feces of this
animal; H3 includes all other benthic in-
vertebrates of the marine community un-
der consideration; and H^ is defined as
the feces of this latter group of animals.
The model is simple in its interactive
structure, and for that reason, quite in-
structive. Causality is expressed as car-
bon flow (gC m~2 y^1) and system state is
represented by carbon storages (gC m~2).
FIGURE 1. Steady state marine coprography
model (Cale and Ramsay 1970). Holon inputs
and outputs represent carbon flows in gC
mT2 y~', and states represent carbon storages
in gC m~2.
Hi Callianassa major
HiC. major feces
#3Benthic invertebrates
iJ^Benthic invertebrate feces
Carbon flow: x's and y's in gC m~2 y"1
z's in gC m~2
Environmental inputs are received at Hi
and H3, and outputs from the system are
generated (respiration) by all four holons.
Table 1 presents the model in tabular
(matrix) form.
To account for all possible holon inter-
actions within such a model, a property
TABLE 1
Steady state marine coprography model H, as shown in figure 1.
''Entries denote carbon flows in gC m 2 y 1. The state variables for Hi, . . . , H\ are xi, . . . , x4,
respectively; zi0 is input from the system's input environmentH] to holons H\ in rows i (i = l, . . . , 4);
yoj is output to the output environment Hn from holons Hs in columns j (j = l, . . . , 4). z and y are
input and output vectors, and T is the throughput vector. Correspondences with figure 1 are obvious.
from
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of mathematical graphs, transitive closure
(Ore 1962), is required. This property is
illustrated for the marine coprophagy
model by the set of matrices shown in
table 2. Let B = (bij) be a binary
TABLE 2
Boolean matrices for the marine
coprophagy model.
Referring to figure 2, let: (1) Hi and
represent subsystem level components
Row and column headings are state vari-
ables xi, . . . , X4 for holons Hi, . . . , HA. Orien-
tation is such that column elements propagate
causality to row elements.
Boolean adjacency matrix denoting di-
rect causal coupling (paths of length one)
from Hj to Hiy i, j = l, . . . , 4. Per-
forming matrix multiplication, B2 entries
identify indirect couplings via paths of
length two, B3 via paths of length three,
and in general Bk via paths of length k.
The table 2 matrices B, B2 and B3 may
be readily verified by reference to figure 1.
oo
The matrix 2 Bk denotes all causal
k = l
paths of all lengths in the system, includ-
ing diverging, converging and feedback
paths. This is the transitive closure
property, meaning that all causality prop-
agated within the system network is ac-
counted for. B* is a transitive closure
matrix. This matrix for the marine
coprophagy model is the last of the set
that appears in table 2.
Leontief (1936) developed a method
for steady state analysis of economic
systems that requires the transitive clos-
ure property. The procedure, as modi-
fied and extended by Finn (1976), in ef-
fect defines within system input and out-
put environments of each component
level holon. The more complicated non-
steady state case is discussed in Patten
et al (1976).
(a)
(b)
FIGURE 2. Derivation of transitive closure
input and output matrices, (I-Q1)"1 and
(I-Q11)"1, respectively, (a) Creaon case; (b)
genon case.
of an n component system H when i,
j = 1, . . . , n; (2) Hj denote system input
environment H' when j = 0; and (3) Hi
be system output environment H" when
i = 0. Input from W to Hj (j = 1, . . . , n)
is ZJO, and output to H]] from Hi is yOi.
In figure 2a, if output yoi is received or
perceived from Hi by some observer, then
the input environment Hi] required to
produce yOi is of interest. Reciprocally,
in figure 2b the environment Hj" of in-
fluence generated in response to Zj0 is the
concern.
In deriving these environments it is
convenient to introduce two sets of iden-
tity constraints.
(1) Interaction constraints: Zij = yij
= F i i , i, j = 0, . . . , n .
(2) Steady state constraints: Zi = yi
= Ti, i = l , . . . ,n
The first identities allow a direct causal
flux Fij from Hj to Hi to be recognized
without distinguishing whether it is an
input Zjj to Hi from Hj (fig. 2a) or an
output yij from Hj to Hi (fig. 2b). The
second constraints make it possible to
recognize the total throughput Ti of Hi
without considering whether it corre-
sponds to total input (fig. 2a) or total out-
put (fig. 2b) from the holon in question.
Intrasystem environments of component
level holons may now be derived.
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CREAON CASE
In figure 2a, let total output yj from
Hi be
n
(3) yj= 2 yij, j = l, . . . , n,
i = 0
where i = 0 denotes output to H". This
latter output yoj to the sysem's environ-
ment can be isolated:
n
(4)
 y j = 2 yii+yoj, j = l, . . . , n ;
i = l
it is illustrated as yOi for Hi in figure 2a.
Applying constraints (1) and (2), the
last expression (4) can be rewritten
(5)
The direct cause Fij from Hj to Hi can be
expressed as a fraction of the throughput.
Ti of Hi-.
(6) F i j = q' i jT i , i, j = l, . . . ,n ,
which, substituted into (5), gives
(7) Tj= 2 q'uTi+yoi, j = l, . . . .n.
In matrix notation this becomes
(8) T = TQ' + ,y
where T is a 2n-dimensional vector of the
n holon throughputs Tj, y is a 2n-dimen-
sional vector of holon outputs to W\ and
Q' is a 2n x 2n matrix of fractional direct
causes q'ij from H} to Hi per unit of
throughput Ti [eq. (4)]. The output
vector y and throughput vector T are in-
cated in table 1 for the marine coprophagy
model. The Q1 matrix for this model is
shown in table 3a. Correspondence of
the intrasystem submatrix with the
Boolean matrix B in table 2 should be
noted. Equation (6) can be solved for T:
(9) ( ' )
where
(10) (I-Q I)ir1 = 0ii/yoi,iJ = l , - - - , n .
Here, </>ij represents the total causal flux
(direct, Fij, plus indirect) from Hj to Hi
overall possible pathways of propagation
TABLE 3
(-4) Fractional input -matrix Q] and (B) fractional output matrix Qv for the marine coprophagy model.
(A)
\
Hi \
X i
x2
x3
x4
Z i o
Z20
Z30
Z40
(B)
\ Hi
\
Hi \
Xi
x2
X3
X4
in
y o i
yo2
yo3
yo4
X i
0
1.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
X l
0
0.176
0
0
0.824
0
0
0
x2
0
0
0.047
0
0
0
0
0
x2
0
0
0.700
0
0
0.300
0
0
x3
0
0
0
1.0
0
0
0
0
X3
0
0
0
0.246
0
0
0.754
0
from
x4
0
0
0.163
0
0
0
0
0
from
x4
0
0
0.664
0
0
0
0
0.336
Zio
1.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
y o i
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Z 2 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
yo2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Z30
0
0
0.789
0
0
0
0
0
yo3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Z40
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
yo4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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through the interconnection network of
H, and (I-QOij"1 represents the amount of
this flux normalized to one unit of out-
put yOi observed from Hi (fig. 2a). Thus,
the matrix (I-Q')~x must be a transitive
closure matrix, and conditions to guaran-
tee this are to be established. The input
environment defining (I-Q1)""1 matrix for
the marine coprophagy model is depicted
in table 4a.
Just as entries in Q1 represent direct
causal links of length 1, (Q1)2 denotes
causality propagated indirectly over
paths of length 2, (Q1)3 over length 3
paths, and in general (Q')k over paths of
length k. From the identity
(11) ( I+Q+Q 2 + . . . ) ( I -Q) = I,
it follows that
£
(12) lim S (Q'^HI-Q1)-1
- ^ c o k = 0
if the limit exists. For the series to con-
verge, (Q')k—>0 as k—»oo; that is, all
causal paths of all lengths must be ac-
counted for. If this (transitive closure)
occurs, the convergence is to an inverse
matrix of the form (I-Q1)""1- Such
matrices are therefore transitive closure
matrices, provided the limit exists.
Existence conditions are well known in
linear algebra (e.g., Faddeev and Fad-
deeva 1963). Ortega (1972), cited by
Hannon (1973), gives the following con-
vergence theorem. Block diagonalize Q',
[x 1 0 . . . 0
(13) Q' =
0 Q-. 0
.(0 0 . . . Q, ,
forming m irreducible block diagonal
submatrices such that det Qi' • det Q21 •
. . . • det Qm' = det Q1. In each block
submatrix sum the state variable entries
in each state variable row. (I-Q')-1
exists if and only if for each block sub-
matrix the sum of state variables in each
row is strictly <1 for at least one state
variable row. The significance is that
at least one component level holon in
TABLE 4
(A) Transitive closure input environment matrix (I-Q])~1 and (B) output environment matrix (/-()")"
for the marine coprophagy model.
(A)
Hi \
X i
x2
x3
x4
Z i o
Z20
Z30
Z40
(B)
\ Hi
\
Hi \
Xi
x2
x3
x4
yoi
V02
yo3
yO4
Xi
1.0
1.0
0.057
0.057
0
0
0
0
Xi
1.0
0.177
0.148
0.036
0.824
0.053
0.111
0.012
x2
0
1.0
0.057
0.057
0
0
0
0
x2
0
1.0
0.837
0.206
0
0.300
0.631
0.069
x3
0
0
1.195
1.195
0
0
0
0
x3
0
0
1.195
0.294
0
0
0.901
0.099
from
x4
0
0
0.195
1.195
0
0
0
0
from
X4
0
0
0.794
1.195
0
0
0.598
0.402
zio
1.0
1.0
0.057
0.057
1.0
0
0
0
yo i
0
0
0
0
1.0
0
0
0
z20
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
yo2
0
0
0
0
0
1.0
0
0
Z30
0
0
0.943
0.943
0
0
1.0
0
y03
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.0
0
Z40
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
yo4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.0
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TABLE 5
Block diagonal forms of (A) creaon matrix Q' {table 3a) and (B) genon matrix Qv (table 3b)
for the marine coprophagy model.
(A)
\ Hi
\
Hi \
x,
x2
Z i o
to
X; j
x4
Z2o
Z30
Z40
(B)
\
Hi \
yo i
x2
y 0 2
to x3
y 4
X4
yos
Xl
state
variables
column 2
zio
1.0*
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
X l
0.824*
0.176
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.176
z2o
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
y o i
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
—
X l
0
1.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
x2
0
0
0.300*
0.700
0
0
0
0
0.700
from
Z30
0
0
0
0.789*
0
0
0
0
from.
x4
0
0
0
0.664
0.336*
0
0
0
0.664
Z40
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
yo2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
—
x2
0
0
0
0.047
0
0
0
0
X3
0
0
0
0
0
0.246
0.754*
0
0.246
x4
0
0
0
0.163
0
0
0
0
yos
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
—
X3
0
0
0
0
1.0
0
0
0
yo4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
—
state
variables
row 2
0
1.0
0.2
1.0
—
—
—
*See text below.
each submatrix must have input contact
with the system's input environment H,
and that this must be true for all of the
m subsystems formed by the matrix di-
agonalization procedure. Thus, to ac-
count for all causal propagation within a
system H, it is necessary to refer to an
environment H outside of H. This is
Proposition 2, for the creaon case.
Block diagonalization of Q1 for the
marine coprophagy model is illustrated
in table 5a. Row sums appear in the
right hand column. For both Qi' and
Q2' the sum of state variable rows is < 1
for at least one such row, namely the row
for xi in Qi' due to input zw to Hi (in-
dicated by an asterisk), and the row for
X3 in Q2' due to input z30 to Hz (asterisk).
Existence of the transitive closure matrix
(I-Q1)"1 for this model is thus established,
and the matrix in fact is illustrated in
table 4a. The input environments Hi},
. . . , Hi] that it defines will be clarified
later.
GENON CASE
A parallel development is required to
establish Proposition 2 with respect to
output environment. In figure 2b, let
the total input z\ to H.x be
n
(14) zi= 2 zij+Zio, i= l , . . . , n,
i = 1
where z i0 (fig. 2b) is input from the sys-
tem level environment W. Applying
equations (1) and (2) as before gives
n
(15) T i= 2 Fij+Zio, i = l, . . . ,n .
3 = 1
Fij can be expressed as a fraction of the
throughput Tj of H}:(16) Fij^q^ijTj, i, j = l, . . . , n ,
which, substituted into (15), results in
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(17)
In matrix notation this becomes
(18) T = Q"T+z,
where T is a 2n-dimensional throughput
vector, z is a 2n-dimensional vector rep-
resenting inputs from H\ and Q" is a
2n x 2n matrix of fractional direct effects)
qij" from Hj to Hi per unit of Tj [eq.116c].
Input z and throughput T vectors for the
marine coprophagy model are indicated
in table 1. Table 3b shows the Q" ma-
trix. Solving eq. (18) for T:
where
(20) (I-Q")ir^ = 0ii/Zio,i,j = l , . : . , n .
0ij is the total (direct, Fij, plus indirect)
effect of H} on Hi transmitted over all
possible paths interconnecting the com-
ponents of H. (I-Q") ij""1 is the same total
effect normalized to a unit of input zj0 to
Hj (fig. 2b). Therefore, (I-Q")-1 re-
quires the transitive closure property,
for which conditions must be established.
This output environment denning ma-
trix for the marine coprophagy model
appears in table 4b.
As before, Q" denotes direct effects
and (Q")k indirect effects over paths of
length k. From identity (11), series con-
vergence is to an inverse matrix,
£
(21) lim 2 (Q")k=(I-Q")r1
^ c o k = 0
if the limit exists. Again, diagonalize
Q" into m irreducible block sub matrices
satisfying det Qi" • det Q2" . . . • det Qm".
In each block submatrix sum the state
variable entries in each state variable
column. (I-Q")-1 exists if and only if
for each submatrix the sum of state vari-
ables in each column is strictly <1 for
at least one state variable column. That
is, at least one holon in each subsystem
represented by a block diagonal matrix
must have output contact with the out-
put environment Hn of H; no subsystem
so defined may lack such contact. Hence,
to account for all propagation of ef-
fects within a system H it is necessary to
reference, as output, an environmental
system Hn external to H. This is Prop-
osition 2 expressed for the genon case.
Block diagonalization of Q" for the
marine coprophagy model is shown in
table 5b. Column sums appear in the
bottom row. For submatrix Qx" the sum
of the only state variable column, xi, is
< 1 due to out put yOi form Hi (shown by
*). In Q2" both state variable column
sums are < 1 because H2 and H4 both gen-
erate output to Hn (asterisks). And in
Q3", column x3 sums to < 1 because of out-
put y03 from H3 (asterisk). The existence
condition for (I-Q")-1 is met for this
model, and the matrix is shown in table
4b. The output environments H\\ . . . ,
Hi] defined by this matrix will be demon-
strated in the next section.
The second proposition has been estab-
lished. The internal interactive struc-
ture of systems cannot be fully specified,
with all causal pathways of all lengths
accounted for, without reference to an
exogenous input or output environment,
or both. The systems must be open
systems. The causal pattern within
closed systems cannot be completely
specified, from which it may be con-
cluded that it is a function of environ-
ments to validate the internal nature of
their defining systems.
As Patten et al (1976) indicate, Propo-
sition 2 can also be realized from Markov
chain theory. Its ultimate generality,
however, is probably conferred by the
fact that it may be a manifestation of
Godel's famous theorem (e.g., Nagel and
Newman 1956) on incompleteness of
logical systems. Godel in what is con-
sidered one of the mathematical land-
marks of this century, showed that the
consistency of any deductive system can-
not be established without reference to
some external system of logic whose own
consistency is in question without refer-
ence to a further external system, etc.
If logical systems have logical "environ-
ments" which must be consulted to
demonstrate internal consistency of the
former, then it should be no surprise that
nature as comprehended by the same
mind that created logic should possess
the same characteristic inherent in the
object/environment relationship.
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Propositions 1 and 2 together signify
that the object (organism)/environment
pair is an inseparable, mutually defining
unit. In the next section, a system is
formulated as a composition of such sub-
system level units.
THIRD PROPOSITION
Proposition 3: A system can be con-
structed as a set union of mutually dis-
joint and exhaustive object/ environment
elements {environs). The within system
object/environment units of Propositions 1
and 2 form a partition at the system level of
organization.
This final proposition can be illustrated
advantageously with the marine co—
prophagy model. First, the formal state-
ment. Let H^ i = l , . . . , n, be a sub-
system level component of an n-com-
ponent system H, with input environ-
ment W and output environment Hn at
the supersystem level. The within sys-
tem input environment of Hi is Hi\ and
the corresponding output environment is
Hin. The creaon/input environment and
genon/output environment units have
been well enough established by Propo-
sitions 1 and 2 that they can be regarded
as entities in their own right. They will
be termed input and output environs
(within system object/environment
units), Ei] and £;" respectively, i = l ,
. . . , n. This is consistent with normal
usage in which the word environ refers
ot nearby surroundings. Here, nearby
means within the boundary of the de-
fined system. Proposition 3 can be for-
mulated in terms of these units: input
environs do not overlap,
(22) £ iV\Ej ' = <k i, j = l, • • • , n,
4> the empty set; output environs also are
nonintersecting,
(23) £ i " n £ j " = <£,_i, j = l, . . . , n ;
and system H is a union of input or out-
put environs,
n n
(24) H= VJ Ei}= \J Ei".
i = l i = l
The sense of these statements will now be
clarified.
Table 4a shows the (I-Q1)"1 transitive
closure matrix for the marine coprophagy
model. This matrix defines the input
environs Ei of this model normalized to
one unit of output yoi from each com-
ponent holon Hi ( i = l , . . . , 4). These
normalized input environs are depicted
in figure 3. Each environ is relative to a
unit output (heavy arrows) from the
component holons. Numbers within the
holon symbols denote throughputs re-
quired to generate the unit outputs;
numbers associated with arrows represent
propagated causes that sum to the
throughputs. Correspondences between
figure 3 and table 4a are obvious. To
express the normalized environs as car-
bon flows (gC m~2 y"1) numbers in the
figure and table must be multiplied by
the corresponding output flux as given in
figure 1. The normalized versions (fig.
3) will be used for interpretation.
Consider £4 ' in figure 3. Observation(measurement) of one unit of carbon out-
put from H^ specifies the indicated causal
network as input environment H±. Cau-
sation is traced back through the network
to its origins at the system boundary.
Most of the output from Hi derives from
input to Hs (94.3%), and only a small
amount (5.7%) originates with Hi input.
The relations shown for the remaining
three input environs are self evident. If
these four normalized environs E\\ . . . ,
£4? are scaled to actual carbon flows and
summed, the original figure 1 system is
reconstructed. That is,
4
(25) H = S E{\
i = l
Thus, the input environs of figure 3 are
nonintersecting [eq. (22)] and also exh-
haustive [eq. (24)], establishing Proposi-
tion 3 for the creaon case.
Table 4b presents the (I-Q")"1 matrix
for the marine coprophagy model. This
matrix defines output environs .Ej" nor-
malized to one unit of input zj0 to each
component holon Hj (j = 1, . . . , 4). These
normalized environs are depicted in figure
4, each in relation to a unit input (heavy
arrows) to the member holons. Numbers
within holon symbols denote through-
puts generated by the unit inputs, and
numbers associated with arrows indicate
propagated effects which sum to the
throughputs. To express the environs
in terms of absolute carbon flows, figure
4 values should be multiplied by the as-
sociated inputs in gC nr~2 y~l as given in
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1.0 '
.057
• 057
• 195
• 9^3
FIGURE 3. Normalized input environs £ / , . . . , £4' which partition the steady state marine
coprophagy model.
figure 1. The normalized environs (fig.
4) will again be interpreted.
In the upper diagram of figure 4 de-
picting £1", 82.4% of Hi input exits the
system at Hh 5.3% at H2, 11.1% at H3
and 1.2% at H4. The within system
propagated effects leading to these out-
puts are shown. The other environs pro-
vide similar information about the fate
of other inputs. If these environs are
dimensionalized to actual carbon flows
(gC m~2 y"1) and the results summed, the
original figure 1 system is again recom-
posed. That is,
4
(26) # = 2 £ / ,
indicating that the output environs E^,
. . . , £4" are mutually exclusive [eq. (23)]
and exhaustive [eq. (24)]. Proposition 3
is therefore established for the genon case.
Thus, for general systems, but espe-
cially for ecosystems which motivate this
theory, within system object (organism)/
environment units (environs) form set
partitions at the system hierarchical
level. Two such partitions are possible,
one by input environs and the other by
output environs. Both are distinct and
different as the input and output en-
virons defined by a given holon are dis-
tinct and different (EiM-Ei", i= l , . . . ,
n). von Uexkull (1926) apparently ap-
preciated the disjoint property of such
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partitions when he wrote, "For each in-
dividual animal, . . . its function-circles
constitute a world by themselves, within
which it leads its existence in complete
isolation."
DISCUSSION
Ecology was stated previously in this
paper to take a fundamentally physio-
logical view of environment. This is
consistent with ordinary usage in which
living or nonliving systems are influenced
by external surroundings. The physio-
logical concept is manifested in Mason
and Langenheim's (1957) theory, which
limits environment to direct causes only.
This is the normal ecological view of
environment, although other viewpoints
(e.g., Haskell 1940) have been offered.
The systems concept outlined above
differs from the normal one in four
particular ways: two environments are
recognized instead of one; indirect cau-
sality is included; the object (organism)/
environment complex is unitary; and
the units (environs) partition reality.
TWO ENVIRONMENTS
The causal holon H is a general systems
object that originates not one, but two,
environments, H (input) and H" (out-
put). If H is a system level object, H
and Hn are supersystem concepts and
cannot be further described. If H is a
subsystem, then its within system
environments can be specified to the
1.0
.069
.012
.099
.402
FIGURE 4. Normalized output environs Ei", . . . , £4" which partition the steady state marine
coprophagy model.
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system boundary as input and output
environs, £ ' and E", respectively. The
environ is a new class of object in system
theory. What it may contribute to the
understanding of ecological or general
systems remains to be seen. For example,
where a holon is a biological object,
inheritance and evolution of its environs
may be reasonable to consider as outward
projections of known genetic mechanisms.
The necessity for objects to interact
consistently within environs provides
constraints that almost certainly guar-
antee coevolution to be an ecosystem
level phenomenon (Patten et at 1976;
Patten 1977). Prospects for an organ-
ismic representation of environment are
quite real in this theory.
The normal one-environment concept
includes only input environment, von
Uexkull (1926) provided a precedent for
output environment in the notion of
function circles that fail of closure (out-
put affecting input) due to complexity
of the external world. Propagated effects
become lost in the general flux of causa-
tion before they can return as identifiable
inputs to the original generating organ-
ism. By explicitly recognizing two en-
vironments, an analytical potential is
gained that is absent in a one-sided the-
ory. Creaon and genon partitions (eg.,
figs. 3 and 4) are never the same, and pat-
terns of how they differ are foreseeable
system properties of interest. For ex-
ample, Patten (1978) has analyzed con-
trol relationships in ecosystem models by
comparing input and output environs of
component holons.
INDIRECT CAUSALITY
Mason and Langenheim (1957) wrote
that to include indirect factors in environ-
ment is to confuse environment with
history. In the two-environment ap-
proach the future enters as a similar
objection. How should time be regarded
in a concept of environment? Two
aspects of the question are dynamic and
static.
Let H be a component of a system
that exists with respect to a cause during
[t\ t\ t}<t<t", teT. (Symbols [, ],
( and ) mean >, <, > and <, respec-
tively, in denoting time intervals.) t1 is
the time the cause initially enters the
system as input, / is present time, and tn
is the time at which a corresponding
effect is generated as system output.
Dynamically, H defines its input and
output environments Hl and H" instan-
taneously at time t through direct inter-
active coupling to other holons of the
system. In input environs E\ indirect
causality, which conditions the direct
coupling events at /, has already occurred
during the past [t\ i\. Thus, an instan-
taneous input environ defined at /
encompasses a historical network of
causation extending backward to the
system boundary at /'. Similarly, in-
direct effects in an instantaneous output
environ E" are propagated from the
direct coupling events at time t during
the future, [t, tn]. The instantaneous
output environ contains the succession of
indirect causes and effects extending
forward to the system boundary at t}\
Note that the system exists with respect
to a cause introduced at t] only during
the interval [/', t]l] required for it to
generate a corresponding effect at tn, and
this is true "vA tn e T. The role of holon
H in the system relative to the same
cause is similarly restricted to the same
interval. Without a temporally finite
model Mason and Langenheim's (1957)
objection of infinite regress, and a
counterpart infinite future progression of
the two-environment theory, would be
valid. So long as a holon's memory of
the past and horizon to the future are
relatively small, so that its system
appears relatively permanent compared
to itself, this permanent organization
should be represented in its environs.
Environment as a concept is not instan-
taneous. It is natural history, a window
on the relatively near past and future,
and to make it so, indirect causality must
be included. Therefore, instantaneous
input environs E] defined at time t
properly span intervals [t\ t], and cor-
responding output environs En span
intervals [t, tn].
The static case reflects this. Static
models depict, usually, steady state
characteristics of systems over time
spans that are long compared to the time
scales of dynamic properties. For exam-
ple, the marine coprophagy model of
figure 1 represents a persistent steady
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state organization expressed as mean
annual carbon storages and flows. Finer
time resolution is not desired, and no
time difference is implied between inputs
and outputs. Each static environ (figs.
3 and 4) represents average relationships
inherent in the system organization year
after year. Historical aspects are sup-
pressed in such static abstractions. This
obscures the fact that the commonsense
concept of environment is actually a
systems concept. It includes indirect
causation implicitly, because in its stasis
it presumes relatively constant ecological
organization over relatively long time
scales.
To illustrate, the immediate physical
and informational environment of my
office here as I write is not the environ-
ment of concern when I consider environ-
mental management or protection. This
local direct environment is well managed
by lights, windows and thermostats. To
continue to guarantee these devices and
my personal well-being, without which
they would be meaningless, I must and
do consider phenomena at the far reaches
of my environs that never will touch this
office directly. DDT, mercury, radio-
activity or a thousand other hazards and
other aspects may or may not ever
directly impinge on me, but they already
affect me and my management of this
place. This knowledge is implicit in
my working approach to environment,
based on a static model in my mind of
both direct and indirect factors. Man as
a species (i.e., as an aggregate holon
denning aggregate input and output
environs) takes account of indirect factors
habitually. Only recently, with the ad-
vent of computers, has this systems
reflex begun to be implemented in non-
static models. Indirect causality is an
integral part of environment, and in both
dynamic and static cases is correctly
included in the systems approach to the
concept.
HOLON/ENVIRONMENT UNITY
In Proposition 1 a holon defines a
pair of environments, and in Proposition
2 these environments confer completeness
upon the holon's internal organization.
Input and output environments may be
considered outward extensions of physi-
cal, chemical or biological characteristics
of the holon's inner organization, mechan-
ism and law. The holon similarly may
be regarded as an inward projection of
the properties of its environments, the
creaon a reflection of input environment
and the genon a reflection of output
environment. An unbroken continuum
of causes and effects streams across the
holon/environment boundary. Proposi-
tions 1 and 2, with probable support from
Godel's theorem (Nagel and Newman
1956), strongly portray the holon/envi-
ronment complex as a unit.
The nature of the relationship between
a defining holon and other holons with
which it interacts only indirectly con-
tributes to a unified concept. Consider
the input environ £4' illustrated at the
bottom of figure 3. H± takes account of
Hs by direct interactive coupling, but
can never have a similar relation to
H2 or Hi, with which it is only indirectly
connected in the model. In the dynamic
case, Hi or H2 may both have gone out
of existence by the time i/4 receives
carbon that they processed. What then
can be said of the relation, if any, of
Hi to Hi and H2? Similarly, for the
genon case refer to output environ E^
depicted at the top of figure 4. Coupling
of Hi to Hi is direct but Hx is only
indirectly related to H3 and H4. Dynam-
ically, Hi may no longer exist by the
time its generated effects are propagated
to H3 and H±. What is the environ-
mental relation, if any, of Hi to H3 and
#4? The denning holon of an input or
output environ is influenced by or influ-
ences all member holons in the environ.
The defining holon becomes, in effect, a
synthesis of its relations to all direct and
indirect phenomena which condition it
(creaon) or which it conditions (genon).
Thus, a holon and its environments are
properly considered as units, as expressed
in the environ concept.
ENVIRON PARTITIONS
A special feature of the present theory
not shared with conventional concepts
of environment is system partition ac-
cording to Proposition 3. As indicated
before, von Uexkull (1926) held that
organisms live isolated within the world
of their own function circles. The same
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idea appears here in the form of holons
relating only to things in their own
environs. The sense in both cases is
not that entities in nature do not interact,
but that the transactions and communi-
cations (energy-matter and information
exchanges, respectively) by which they
do so are unique. If environs of different
holons are disjoint, they also may be
dissimilar even if the same physical
phenomena are represented. A real en-
tity depicted in an environ of Hi may
have a different character and significance
when represented in an environ of Hj.
An environ is then an abstraction formed
by its defining holon—a representation
or model of that holon's separate reality.
Presumably, it is refined and improved
in some evolutionary synthesis appro-
priate to the holon's physical, or biologi-
cal nature and level of organization.
How these disjoint models combine to
exhaust the concrete reality which is
nature is for philosophers, and not
ecologists, to understand.
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